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Loughborough University, Department of Economics
Abstract
We introduce R&D activity and R&D subsidies in the context of
a mixed oligopoly and evaluate the e¤ects of privatization on welfare.
We show that when R&D subsidies are employed, privatization is wel-
fare and R&D promoting provided that the number of competitors is
su¢ ciently large.
Keywords: mixed oligopoly, process innovation, R&D subsidy, pri-
vatization.
JEL Classication: L31, L32, O38, L13, L50.
1 Introduction
There is a large body of literature on mixed oligopolies analyzing the ef-
fects on welfare of privatization. Interestingly, White (1996) and Poyago
Theotoky (2001) showed that when policy makers use output subsidies as
a policy instrument, the issue of privatization is not welfare related. Fur-
ther, Fjell and Heywood (2004) proved that privatization will bear negative
consequences on welfare if the public rm remains as a leader in the post-
privatization regime.
The analysis in these papers has been conned to output production and
consequently, subsidies to output. However, the study of the R&D activity
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and R&D subsidies in the context of mixed oligopolies has not yet been
considered, despite the signicant empirical evidence citing the importance
of public funding towards R&D (Katz, 2001) and the substantial presence
of public rms in innovative industries (examples are the health-care sector,
Aanestad, 2003, and bioagriculture, Oehmke, 2001).
In this paper, we study the use of R&D subsidies in the context of a
mixed oligopoly and evaluate the e¤ects of a privatization. We show that,
apart from addressing the market failures arising from the R&D activity, the
use of R&D subsidies corrects (to some extent) the ine¢ cient distribution
of production costs which arises in mixed industries. In that sense, an R&D
subsidy may (at least partially) serve the same purpose as an output subsidy.
Our results indicate that the optimal subsidy to R&D output is non-
monotone in the number of private rms both in the private and the mixed
markets and it is always lower for the former than for the latter. Further,
when R&D subsidies are employed, privatization may increase total R&D
and welfare provided that the number of private rms is su¢ ciently large.
The latter contrasts with the results obtained in previous contributions,
where output subsidies are employed.
2 The model
Consider an industry consisting of n identical private rms and a public rm
producing a homogeneous good. The inverse demand function is linear and
given by p(Q) = a Q; Q is aggregate output, Q = q0+
Pn
i=1 qi, q0 denotes
the output of the public rm and qi, i = 1; ::; n, is the output of the i-th
private rm. We postulate that all rms engage in cost-reducing (process)
R&D and there are no spillovers.1 Thus, the production cost of each rm
is represented by the quadratic function Cj(xj ; qj) = (c   xj)qj + q2j , j 2
f0; 1; :::; ng, where xj is the cost reduction of the j-th rm and a > c > 0.2
We also make the standard assumption that R&D spending is subject to
diminishing returns to R&D expenditure,  j(xj) = x2j , j 2 f0; 1; :::; ng.
1 In other words, the patent system is fully e¤ective.
2The presence of the quadratic term is standard in the mixed oligopoly literature
and rules out the possibility of a public monopoly by introducing diminishing returns in
production.
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A rms prot function is given by
j = qj(a 
nX
j=0
qj)  (c  xj)qj   q2j   x2j + sxj , j 2 f0; 1; :::; ng, (1)
where s denotes the (per unit) subsidy to R&D output. Social welfare,
dened as the sum of consumer surplus, CS = (1=2)Q2 and producer surplus
net of R&D subsidies is given by
SW = CS +
nX
j=0
j   s
nX
j=0
xj . (2)
The timing of the game is as follows: In stage one, the government com-
mits to a subsidy on R&D output so as to maximize welfare. In stage two,
rms make their R&D decisions and in the last stage, a standard Cournot
game is played. We solve the entire game by backward induction to ob-
tain the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE henceforth) for both a
mixed and a private oligopoly and compare the results across the two mar-
ket arrangements.
3 Mixed oligopoly
Solving the last stage of the game, the respective equilibrium quantities of
the public and the private rms are
qm0 (x0; xi) =
3(a  c) + (3 + n)x0  
Pn
i=1 xi
2n+ 9
(3)
qmi (x0; xi) =
2(a  c)  x0 + (3=n)
Pn
i=1 xi
2n+ 9
(4)
In the second stage, the associated equilibrium R&D output levels are3
xm0 (s) =
(a  c)[ 3 + n(47 + 6n)]  2n2(6 + n)s
 15 + n[235 + 102n+ 12n2] , (5)
xmi (s) =
3(a  c)(3 + n)(1 + 2n) + n[135 + n(56 + 6n)]s
 15 + n[235 + 102n+ 12n2] ; i 2 f1; :::; ng.(6)
As it can be seen from xm0 and x
m
i , the subsidy exerts a positive e¤ect on
3The second order condition for the public rm requires 135 + 56n + 6n2 > 0 and for
each private rm, 9  21n+ 75n2 + 36n3 + 4n4 > 0. Indeed, both conditions are fullled.
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the R&D output of a private rm, whereas the reverse holds for the public
rm. This implies that, similarly to an output subsidy (see White 1996;
PoyagoTheotoky 2001), a subsidy to R&D has a cost redistribution e¤ect.
Hence, we can state that R&D subsidies may serve (at least partially) the
same purpose as output subsidies.
Substituting (3)   (6) into (2) and performing the maximization with
respect to s, we obtain the optimal subsidy4
sm =
(a  c)(5n  3)
n(5 + n)(7 + 2n)
. (7)
The SPNE solutions of the entire game are the following
qmi =
(a  c)(9 + 2n)
(5 + n)(7 + 2n)
; qm0 =
(a  c)(14 + 3n)
(5 + n)(7 + 2n)
xmi =
(a  c)(6 + n)
(5 + n)(7 + 2n)
;xm0 =
(a  c)(7 + n)
(5 + n)(7 + 2n)
mi =
(a  c)2[ 18 + n(153 + 65n+ 7n2)]
n(5 + n)2(7 + 2n)2
m0 =
(a  c)2[ 21 + n(179 + 75n+ 8n2)]
n(5 + n)2(7 + 2n)2
CSm =
2(a  c)2[7 + n(6 + n)]2
(5 + n)2(7 + 2n)2
; (8)
SWm =
(a  c)2[7 + n(7 + n)]
(5 + n)(7 + 2n)
: (9)
It is important to note that although the optimal R&D subsidy im-
proves the distribution of total costs, it does not restore cost e¢ ciency.
Thus, it attains a second best in the sense that complete equalization of
production costs would require an additional instrument a subsidy to out-
put quantity at the governments disposal.
4 Private oligopoly
The industry now consists of (n+1) prot-maximizing (private) rms. The
SPNE outcomes of the game are5
4With requirement for second order condition 6n3(5+n)(7+2n)(135+56n+6n2) > 0.
5The associated second order conditions are all satised and available upon request.
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sp =
4(a  c)(3n  2)
3n(3 + n)(9 + 2n)
qpi = q
p
0 =
2(a  c)(4 + n)
(3 + n)(9 + 2n)
xpi = x
p
0 =
(a  c)(5 + n)
(3 + n)(9 + 2n)
pi = 
p
0 =
(a  c)2[ 40 + n(361 + 174n+ 21n2)]
3n(3 + n)2(9 + 2n)2
CSm =
2(a  c)2(1 + n)2(4 + n)2
(3 + n)2(9 + 2n)2
SW p =
(a  c)2(1 + n)(5 + n)
(3 + n)(9 + 2n)
: (10)
5 Results and Discussion
Comparing the results obtained in the mixed oligopoly and the private
oligopoly cases, we can state the following results:6
Proposition 1 The optimal subsidy to R&D output in the mixed oligopoly
is always greater than the subsidy in the private oligopoly, sm(n) > sp(n).
The intuition behind proposition 1 follows: In the case of a private
oligopoly, two sources of market failure exist: (i) the imperfect competition,
which will lead to underproduction (and hence, allocative ine¢ ciency), and
(ii) the R&D undervaluation e¤ect (as dened by Ulph, 19997), which will
lead to under-investment in R&D by private rms. In the case of a mixed
oligopoly a further source of market failure exists, the di¤erent nature (pub-
lic or private) of the rms in the market. As a result, the production costs
are ine¢ ciently distributed. Hence, it is optimal for the decision-maker to
subsidize more heavily a mixed market.
Proposition 2 The optimal subsidy to R&D output, s i(n), i = m, p, is
always positive and increasing in the number of private rms n, as n goes
from 1 to 2 , but decreasing in n if n > 2 .
6All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
7Private rms do not take into account the increases in Consumers Welfare as a con-
sequence of the investment on R&D (as Consumers Welfare does not belong to their
objective function). This will result in underinvestment in R&D.
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Proposition 2 shows that, in contrast to the monotonic nature of an out-
put subsidy identied in previous contributions, the optimal R&D subsidy is
initially increasing and after a threshold value of the number of rms (n = 2)
decreasing. This is a result of the interaction of the market failures identi-
ed above. The e¤ect of imperfect competition becomes less important as
the number of rms increases whereas the undervaluation e¤ect will have
an inverted U-shape with respect to the number of rms, as identied by
Suzumura (1992). The combination of these two e¤ects (plus the ine¢ ciency
in the distribution of the production costs in the mixed case) results in an
inverted U-shape of the optimal subsidy.
The next proposition compares total R&D output, output quantity and
prots between the mixed and the private oligopolies:
Proposition 3 (i) Total R&D output in the private oligopoly is higher than
in the mixed oligopoly if n > 4 ; (xm0 +nx
m
i ) < (n + 1 )x
p
i . (ii) Total output
quantity in the mixed oligopoly always exceeds total output quantity in the
private oligopoly; (qm0 +nq
m
i ) > (n + 1 )q
p
i . (iii) Total prot in the private
oligopoly always exceeds total prot in the mixed one; (m0 +n
m
i ) < (n + 1 )
p
i .
With regard to proposition 3, it is relevant to note that the public rm
will tend to reduce its R&D investment more than a private rm as n in-
creases, i.e., j @xm0@n j> j
@xmi
@n j, leading therefore to higher levels of total
R&D output in the private oligopoly than in the mixed one for su¢ ciently
large n (n > 4). It turns out, however, that the public rms behavior
will not impact total output quantity in the same way and output will be
always higher in the mixed oligopoly than in the private one. Regarding
equilibrium prots, the underproduction problem will be more serious in
the private oligopoly than in the mixed one as a result of the lower inten-
sity of competition, leading thus to higher oligopoly rents and allocative
ine¢ ciency.
The next proposition contains a welfare assessment of privatization poli-
cies and is largely a consequence of Proposition 3:
Proposition 4 When government policy takes the form of an optimal sub-
sidy to R&D output, then privatization enhances total welfare if n > 4 ,
SWm(n) < SW p(n).
6
The intuition for the above proposition follows: First, we can state that
typically privatization improves productive e¢ ciency. The reason is that in
the move from the mixed to the private oligopoly optimum, the ine¢ ciency
in the distribution of production costs vanishes. However, privatization
worsens allocative e¢ ciency as it promotes higher oligopoly rents. It turns
out that the gains in terms of productive e¢ ciency will outweigh the losses
in terms of allocative e¢ ciency only if n is su¢ ciently large.
6 Conclusion
This paper aims at lling a gap in the literature on mixed oligopolies and
privatization by introducing R&D activity and R&D subsidies. Our results
indicate that the optimal subsidy to R&D output is non-monotone in the
number of private rms both in the private and the mixed markets and
that the mixed industry should be more heavily subsidized than the private
one. Similarly to an output subsidy, a subsidy to R&D can address the
ine¢ cient distribution of costs. However, in contrast to the welfare results
of privatization when output subsidies are provided, privatization is welfare
enhancing if the number of rms in the industry is su¢ ciently high. Further,
under the same condition, privatization yields increases in the total R&D
levels. In industries with a small number of rms, privatization would result
in a loss of surplus and decreases in the R&D activity.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: It is immediate to show that sm(n) > 0 as a  c > 0
and  3 + 5n > 0 8n 2 Z+. Next, sm(1) < sm(2) because a c27 < a c22 . To
show that sm is decreasing in n i¤ n > 2, ignore that n is an integer; it must
be shown that ds
m
dn < 0 i¤ n > 2. This derivative has the same sign as the
expression 105 + 102n  67n2   20n3. The latter is negative i¤ n > 2. (The
proof for sp(n) is similar and hence is omitted). QED
Proof of Proposition 2 : It will be shown that sm(n) sp(n) > 0 8n 2 Z+.
To this end, ignore that n is an integer. Then it su¢ ces to show that
37  14n+ 19n2 + 6n3 > 0 8n, which in turn is always true. QED
Proof of Proposition 3 : Let   = (3+n)(9+2n) > 0 and  = (5+n)(7+
2n) > 0. We have the following (ignoring that n 2 Z+):
(i) (xm0 +nx
m
i )  (n+1)xpi = (a c)(14 n n
2)
  < 0 i¤ 14 n n2 < 0. The
inequality holds i¤ n > 4.
(ii) (qm0 + nq
m
i )  (n+ 1)qpi = 2(a c)(49+24n+3n
2)
  > 0 8n.
(iii) (m0 + n
m
i )  (n+ 1)pi =   (a c)
2	
3n 22
< 0 i¤ 	 > 0, where
	 =  3073 + 44548n + 151318n2 + 139764n3 + 59759n4 + 13400n5 +
1540n6 + 72n7. It is not di¢ cult, although tedious, to show that 	 > 0 8n,
which completes the proof. QED
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Proof of Proposition 4 : In proving that SWm(n) < SW p(n) i¤ n > 4,
it su¢ ces to show that  14 + n + n2 > 0 i¤ n > 4. The result follows
immediately. QED
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